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Claims about neoliberalism and its geographies frequently involve assumptions 
about the affective life of neoliberalism and/or neoliberal societies. However, 
existing cultural approaches to neoliberalism as a discursive formation, an ideology 
or governmentality collapse a concern with affect into a focus on the operation of 
signifying-subjectfying processes that make ‘neoliberal subjects’. Political economy 
approaches only make implicit claims about the ‘mood’ of neoliberal societies. In this 
paper, I argue that collective affects are part of the conditions of formation for 
particular neoliberalisms and therefore understanding the affective life of 
neoliberalism is critical to explaining how it emerges, forms and changes. Through 
examples including The Mont Pelerin Society, the Chicago School of Economics and 
Thatcherism, I propose a vocabulary that supplements existing approaches by 
focusing on the affective conditions for neoliberalism, specifically the atmospheres that 
are part of the formation of neoliberal reason and the structures of feeling that 
condition how particular neoliberalisms actualise in the midst of other things. The 
result is a way of discerning neoliberalisms as both conditioned by affects and 
‘actually existing’ affectively – as dispersed affective ‘qualities’ or ‘senses’.  
 
Keywords: Affect, Neoliberal, Foucault, Structures of Feeling, Atmospheres, 
Neoliberalism 
Neoliberal Affects  
 
I: Introduction: ‘A climate’  
 
After returning from the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the founding of 
the Mont Pelerin Society, Milton Friedman reflects on ‘victory’ in the war of ideas. 
Whilst the “regulatory and welfare state” remained a “threat to freedom” (Friedman 
and Friedman 1998: 582), Friedman notes a change in the ‘climate of opinion’ 
between 1997 and the founding of the Society in 1947. He writes:   
 
“To judge from the climate of opinion, we have won the war of ideas. Everyone 
– left or right – talks about the virtues of markets, private property, 
competition, and limited government. No doubt the Mont Pelerin Society and 
its many associates around the world deserve some credit for that change in the 
climate of opinion, but it derives much more from the sheer force of reality: the 
fall of the Berlin wall: the tremendous success of the Far eastern tigers … and, 
more recently, Chile”.  
(Friedman and Friedman 1998: 582/583) 
 
Writing ten years earlier a very different writer, with a very different tone, and for 
very different purposes, hesitated before naming a similar change in ‘climate’. In his 
influential 1978 analysis of the UK’s ‘swing to the right’, Stuart Hall points to a 
vague, indefinite, change in ‘climate’ that, for him, accompanies the incorporation of 
neoliberal themes of anti-collectivism and anti-statism into Thatcherism. ‘In’ this 
climate monetarist economic thought grows in acceptability: 
 
“Gradually, in the more hospitable climate of the 1970s, these seeds began to 
bear fruit. First in the learned journals, then in the senior common rooms, and 
finally in informal exchanges between the `new academics` and the more 
`sensitive` senior civil servants, a monetarist version of neo-classical economics 
came to provide the accepted frame for economic debate”.  
(Hall 1988: 47) 
 
Friedman and Hall are but two examples of occasions in which collective affects are 
taken to be part of neoliberalisms – ambiguous affects named vaguely as a gradual 
‘change in the climate of opinion’ or a more ‘hospitable climate’ for ideas. Affects 
that are also and at the same time part of other partially connected formations (the 
series of geo-political shocks and transformations named by Friedman, for example). 
In this paper I develop this intuition that affects matter to neoliberalism. I argue that 
collective affects are part of the sites, networks, and flows of neoliberalism. And that, 
consequently, any attempt to understand ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner & 
Theordore 2002: 353) must learn to sense neoliberalism’s affective spaces. For what is 
at stake is discerning the real conditions of emergence for particular neoliberalisms and 
the continual (re)conditioning of emerged but still in formation neoliberalisms. 
Neoliberalisms are, then, at once conditioned by multiple collective affects and 
‘actually exist’ affectively – they are present as dispersed affective ‘qualities’ or 
‘senses’ such as a ‘climate of opinion’ or a ‘more hospitable climate’.  
Attending to neoliberalism’s affective life is one way, then, of tracing how 
neoliberal reason is attached to and invested in as it travels and is (re)formed. Where 
we can use the term ‘affect’, to begin with, as a generic descriptor for the ‘feeling of 
existence’; how a room may have a ‘charged’ atmosphere, the historical present may 
seem to be animated by a ‘climate’, or a policy may be ‘aspirational’, for example. As 
these examples indicate, affects are not simply properties of the individual body and 
are not somehow asubjective and preindividual, or non-representational. Affect as 
intensive ‘capacities to affect and be affected’ is but one translation of the term, albeit 
the one that has garnered most critical attention in human geography (see Thrift 
2004; McCormack 2003; and for critiques Barnett 2008; Pile 2010). As used in this 
paper, and following Anderson (2014), affect is an umbrella category that 
encompasses qualitatively distinct ways of organising the ‘feeling of existence’. 
Atmospheres, structures of feeling and other pragmatic-contextual translations of 
the term ‘affect’ are ways in which things become significant and relations are lived. 
This means that affects are always organised and becoming organised, in ways that 
likely differ from subjectifying-signifying systems of meaning. However, 
understanding the geo-historical affects of any “polymorphic, hybrid phenomena” 
(Peck 2010: 280) requires that we suspend claims that affective life today is organised 
in a single, identifiable way; that we live in a ‘age of fear’ or ‘age of anxiety’. Even a 
cursory acknowledgment of the complexity of neoliberalism makes absurd any tight 
homology between particular affects and neoliberalism. As is now well established, 
neoliberalism is not a singular, coherent, entity with a simple origin point. As Peck 
(2010) makes clear neoliberalism has a series of internal tensions and contradictions. 
Then, neoliberalism is open to its outsides. It does not only co-exist with them. New 
hybrids are formed as neoliberal styles of reasoning and techniques encounter 
diverse political-economic forms and logics of governing. These hybrids are not only 
doomed attempts to ‘alleviate’ the worst excesses of neoliberalism (Collier 2012). Roy 
(2012: 275) puts this well when she stresses the “inevitable incompleteness of 
neoliberalism as well as its constant reinvention”. To compound the challenges for 
analysis, other socio-spatial formations are themselves already-always affective, so 
neoliberal affects will coexist and blur with the affects of weak reciprocity that 
animated the European liberal welfare state, for example, or the promise of a 
normative good life that sustained social democracy (Berlant 2011) 
This means that we should treat the term ‘neoliberal affects’ with caution. 
Neoliberalism is not a catch-all designator for contemporary capitalism and 
‘neoliberal affects’ do not simply name a set of identifiable collective emotions. Nor 
are ‘neoliberal affects’ the point of contact between structure and subject, in which 
an all-powerful and already-constituted neoliberalism determines what is felt. 
Rather, I use the term ‘neoliberal affects’ in two ways, both of which involve 
particular translations of my starting definition of affect as the ‘feeling of existence’. 
First, ‘neoliberal affects’ refer to the atmospheres that envelope and animate neoliberal 
reason as it emerges, circulates and changes. Second, ‘neoliberal affects’ refer to the 
structures of feeling that in enigmatic ways accompany the translation of neoliberal 
reason into policies and projects. Whilst this begs the question of what neoliberal 
reason is, which I will come to in the next section, what it does is make affects parts 
of and conditions for neoliberal reason. My aim, in short, is to articulate some of the 
collective affects of/for neoliberalism specific to the UK and USA, without 
reproducing a totalising account of the omnipresence of neoliberalism, and whilst 
offering a conceptual vocabulary designed to enable a conjunctural analysis of how 
neoliberal affects varied in neoliberalism’s “other birthplaces” (Peck 2010: 39) and 
differ across its current “socio-spatial frontiers” (ibid. 6).  
The paper proceeds in three sections. Through a reading of Michel Foucault's 
1978-79 lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics, in section two I emphasise how 
neoliberal reason exists and happens in the midst of a range of affects. My emphasis 
is on the life of neoliberal reason, that is, those affects that saturate the formation, 
circulation, articulation and translation of neoliberal reason. Here I distinguish my 
emphasis on affect from other ways of doing a cultural analysis of neoliberalism. 
Through examples including the Mont Pelerin Society, the Chicago School of 
Economics and Thatcherism, the remainder of the paper proposes a vocabulary for 
understanding neoliberalism as conditioned by and actually existing as: atmospheres 
that are part of the formation of neoliberal reason (section III) and structures of feeling 
that fold into how neoliberalisms actualise in the midst of other things (section IV).  
The paper aims to supplement cultural analyses of neoliberalism. Whilst there 
are significant differences and tensions in how representation and signification are 
understood, cultural work on neoliberalism has been primarily concerned with 
specifying the effects of signifying-subjectifying processes. The emphasis has been 
on how neoliberalism as an economic-political formation is discursively or 
ideologically articulated and expressed, in part through the semantic construction of 
various supposedly neoliberal things (bodies, identities, subjectivities, and so on). 
This is important and necessary work. A concern with affect is not other to a concern 
with signifying-subjectfying mechanisms. But, it is to recognise them as but one 
form/process of mediation, inseperable from a Euro-Modern version of ‘culture’. 
What a concern with neoliberal affects does, then, is multiple the forms/processes of 
mediation by attending to how the ‘feel of existence’ is conditioned and conditions.  
 
II: Affect and Theories of Neoliberalism 
  
Whatever kind of thing neoliberalism is taken to be (Gilbert 2013), claims are 
frequently made about the connection between it and contemporary affective life. 
Very often, this involves claims that the neoliberal present has something like a 
commonly felt and identifiable mood, normally of fear and anxiety aligned to the 
insecurities of lives lived precariously amidst a “generalised and heightened sense of 
expectancy of what has not yet come” (Clough & Wise 2011: 2). Typically, 
neoliberalism is equated with the contemporary moment/form of capitalism. This 
has led to a flurry of attempts to diagnose an affective economy in which intensive 
capacities are captured within a new regime of capital accumulation oriented to 
‘affect itself’ and characterised by the dominance of ‘affective labour’ (Clough 2009). 
Whilst these diagnoses remind us of the patterning of affective life and its 
imbrication with processes of commodification (Nast 2006), they nevertheless risk 
reproducing what Larner (2003) and others have identified as the totalising effect of 
the neoliberal formulation. A variant of this approach, that likewise presumes the 
existence and coherence of neoliberalism, attempts to map its affective damages. 
Consider, for example, the following claim by Hall & O’Shea (2013):  
 
“The structural consequences of neoliberalism – the individualisation of 
everyone, the privatisation of public troubles and the requirement to make 
competitive choices at every turn – has been paralleled by an upsurge in 
feelings of insecurity, anxiety, stress and depression.” 
(Hall & O’Shea 2013: 6, emphasis in original) 
 
In these analyses, attempts are made to establish a relation between neoliberalism as 
economic-political formation and changes over time in the occurrence of 
individually felt but shared moods (e.g. Dardot & Laval (2014) on the relation 
between depression and the naturalisation of competition). Whilst this research is 
timely and important, neoliberalism acts as the starting point of analysis, is given a 
causal role, and becomes the dominant framing context. Neoliberalism is made into 
a ‘big Leviathan’ that determines affective life: a “macro-structure or explanatory 
background against which other things can be understood” (Collier 2012: 186).  
What this work does emphasise, however, is neoliberalism’s affective life. 
Indeed, most approaches to neoliberalism make some kind of implicit claim about 
affect and how neoliberalism reorders contemporary affective life. For example, 
Harvey (2005: 82) gestures towards how, in the meeting of variants of neoliberalism 
and neoconservativism in contemporary USA, a ‘paranoid style of politics’ and an 
emphasis on ‘morality’ compensate for a potential “breakdown of all bonds of 
solidarity and a condition verging on social anarchy and nihilism”. Even if only in 
the background to political economy analyses, such asides and assumptions appeal 
to a kind of affectivity in common. Harvey (2005: 81) claims, for example, that 
industrial democracies are characterised by a “mood” of “helplessness and anxiety”. 
Perhaps in at least some Marxist political economy work there is an unconscious 
echo of a tradition of Marxist literary analysis that foregrounded affect as an index of 
shared embeddedness in a dynamic geo-historical present (see Berlant 2011).  
By contrast, existing cultural approaches focus explicitly on one way 
neoliberal affects are organised: through signifying-subjectfying systems of meaning. 
In doing so, they move from general claims about ‘mood’ towards specifying one of 
the particular ways in which ‘capacities to affect and be affected’ are mediated. 
Consider, for example, approaches to neoliberalism as ideology/ideological project. 
Whether understood as composed of beliefs, values or ideas, ideology works 
affectively. As Grossberg (2010: 194/195) stresses, ideological effects of naturalness 
and inevitability are produced through the “the affective investments in particular 
significations that grants them the claim to represent the world”. Slightly differently, 
approaches to neoliberalism as ‘discourse’ track the relays between the ‘rules of 
formation’ for a discourse and how affective investments and attachments are 
organised (typically around processes of othering that work through negation). For 
an example of approaches that mix the ideological and discursive consider work that 
explicates how neoliberalism becomes ‘common-sense’. At the level of ideas, Hall 
and O’Shea (2013) stress, after Gramsci, that neoliberal common-sense is 
”incoherent” (4) or “contradictory” (3), made up of disjunctive elements. And yet, at 
the level of affect, common-sense “feels coherent” (2), it becomes intuitive. Whilst 
they recognise that “affective dimensions” are “at play” (6) and “underpin” (6) 
common-sense, their emphasis is representational-referential; on how common-sense 
provides “frameworks of meaning with which to make sense of the world” (1).  
Governmentality approaches grant a more specific role to affect, but collapse 
a concern with affect into a focus on top-down ‘subjectification’. Recent work has 
shown how specific ‘capacities to affect and be affected’ are invoked when 
attempting to produce the supposedly archetypal ‘neoliberal subject’. Work has 
highlighted how the obligation that the subject becomes “an entrepreneur of himself 
or herself” (Ong 2007: 14) is accompanied by the investment of hope in the market as 
the source of a good or better life and the weakening of hope in other collective 
solutions (see Mitchell 2006; Langley 2014; Sparke 2006). This redirection of affective 
energies to the ‘freedom’ of the market happens alongside attempts to inculcate 
feelings and practices of individualised responsibility and self-care in the midst of a 
background of intensified insecurity (see Bondi 2005; Walkerdine 2005). Other work 
has highlighted the specific affective capacities necessary to sustain the active, 
striving, relation to the future supposedly necessary for (self)investment. Raco 
(2008), for example, stresses how mid-late 2000s welfare reform in the UK involved 
attempts to create ‘aspirational citizens’ marked by a hope in individualised social 
mobility. Recent work has developed this implicit complication of the equation 
between the neoliberal subject and the rational, calculative subject. Pedwell (2012: 
283), for example, argues that as part of a broader move to governing through 
emotions ‘empathy’ “has become part and parcel of being a self-managing and self-
enterprising individual in a neoliberal order” (see also Isin (2004) on the ‘neurotic 
subject’ who acts on the basis of its anxieties and insecurities). Whilst this work 
reminds us that ‘neoliberal subjects’ do not equate to the rational subject, affect is 
treated as another object-target of top-down processes of subjectification. By 
focusing on governmentalities, affect is reduced to a material to be manipulated or 
moulded to form subjects in conformity with neoliberal polices or programmes. 
Routing affect through a concern with subjectivity is not unique to governmental 
approaches, however. For example, Dean (2008), after Zizek on neoliberalism as an 
ideological formation that organises enjoyment through the fantastic promise of free 
trade, argues that neoliberalism operates through new affective subject positions to 
be inhabited or othered (the ‘shopaholic’ or ‘incorrigible criminal’).     
So affect is far from absent in existing cultural work on neoliberalism, but it is 
secondary to a concern with ideological or discursive mediation and/or collapsed 
into a focus on the formation of purportedly ‘neoliberal subjects’. I will come to some 
exceptions to this below, but this has two consequences in addition to presuming 
that ‘subjectification’ is how power operates (see Barnett 2015). First, analysis focuses 
on (cognitive, semiotic) meaning, resulting in only a truncated range of affective 
expressions being attended to. Second, analysis focuses on one form of mediation – 
signifying-subjectifying processes – to the exclusion of other processes and 
conditions. By which I mean the ways in which affects form part of the backgrounds 
through which economic-political formations come to form and are lived. Where the 
term ‘condition’ points to a dynamic set of background affects: how an atmosphere 
‘envelopes’ or how a structure of feeling ‘pressures’ (see Anderson 2014).  
The relation between the ongoing organisation of collective affects and the 
grip and tenacity of neoliberalism is intimated in some diagnoses of neoliberalism’s 
exclusionary mechanisms and damages. For example, Tyler (2013) shows how 
stigma is used to justify punitive state intervention over raced and classed peoples 
who are abandoned by, excluded from or otherwise cast out of the market. Likewise, 
Wacquant (2010) ties the ascent of restrictive workfare and expansive prisonfare to a 
complex translation of various senses of social and economic insecurity into forms of 
resentment. ‘Punitive containment’ resonates with a specific affective condition:   
 
“It taps the diffuse social anxiety coursing through the middle and lower regions 
of social space in reaction to the splintering of wage work and the resurgence of 
inequality, and converts it into popular animus towards welfare recipients and 
street criminals … ”. 
(Wacquant 2010: 204, emphasis added) 
 
As well as an example of the important, but often implicit, role claims about affect 
have in all work on neoliberal life, and he also talks about ‘simmering ethnic 
resentment’ and ‘popular resentment’ (Wacquant 2010: 207, 217), Wacquant shows 
how collective affects condition the new government of poverty. We can push this 
implicit recognition of the relation between affect and neoliberalism further by 
asking: How does neoliberal reason emerge from specific affects?; And how do 
collective affects coexist - resonate, interfere etc - with the other conditions and 
processes that constitute actually existing neoliberalisms? This requires that we shift 
analysis from affect as an object-target of processes of subjectification to affects as 
dynamic collective conditions that neoliberalisms happen in and through.  
In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault (2008) offers a novel account of 
neoliberalism that opens up a different way of thinking about the constitutive role of 
affects. In the background to his diagnosis of neoliberalism are a series of collective 
affects. For example, he (2008: 66) describes ‘stimulation of the fear of danger’ as the 
“condition” of liberalism. Fear is the affective expression of the dangers that are 
“perpetually being brought to life” (ibid. 66) in the interplay between freedom and 
security. There is a hint here that collective affects operate in ways that may be 
related to but exceed discursive or ideological forms and processes. Explicating what 
is implicit in Foucault’s lectures requires that we pause and attempt to articulate 
what, for him, marks the specificity of neoliberalism. Foucault locates the novelty of 
neoliberalism in a particular problematisation of the relation between government 
and the market. Neoliberalism “breaks” (Foucault 2008: 119) with and effects 
“transformations” (ibid. 131) in a classical liberalism that, Foucault argues, was 
based on an operative principle of ‘laissez-faire’ and a conception of the market as a 
natural mechanism of exchange. Anticipating recent work on how neoliberalism 
institutes new state arrangements (Mirowski 2013: 16; Dardot & Lavel 2014; Peck & 
Tickell 2002), Foucault argues that neoliberalism involves continuous intervention by 
the state at the level of the ‘framework’ or the ‘rules of the games’, with the aim and 
hope of creating “the concrete and real space in which the formal structure of 
competition could function” (Foucault 2008: 132).  
What Foucault (2008: 132) describes as the “permanent vigilance, activity, and 
intervention” of neoliberalism happens in order to extend and intensify the market. 
It is less an intervention into the market, and more an intervention into previously 
non-economic domains to attempt to create the conditions for the market and, 
simultaneously, “a general regulation of society by the market” (ibid. 145). 
Neoliberalism is not, then, simply an intensified “laissez-faire” based on what 
Harvey (2005: 20) calls “free market principles of neo-classical economics” (even if 
rhetorically ‘laissez-faire’ may be evoked, particularly in the USA (Gamble 2006)). 
Rather, for Foucault (2008: 243), neoliberalism inverts the relation between the social 
and the economic through an “absolute” or “unlimited” generalisation of a 
particular form of the market – competition between unequals (although Foucault 
distinguishes between German and American neoliberalisms on this point, the 
former having an “economic-ethical ambiguity” (ibid. 241) around competition). The 
market in the form of competition comes to act as a) a generalizable grid of 
intelligibility and b) a test that acts as the ground for a criticism of government. The 
novelty of neoliberalism across national differences consists, for Foucault, in making 
a particular form of the market – relations of competition as expressed in the 
enterprise form (ibid. 241) – the ‘formative principle’ of the social and undertaking 
interventions to create the conditions for competition throughout life.  
By specifying what makes neoliberalism new Foucault avoids an ‘inflationary’ 
use of the term that makes it ubiquitous but elusive (Collier 2011: 246). 
Unsurprisingly given the provisionality of the lecture form and when he was 
speaking, Foucault’s emphasis on competition sits uneasily with the recent emphasis 
on the travels of neoliberalism and processes of geo-historical translation, expression 
and articulation (see, for example, Brenner et al 2010; Collier 2011). Indeed, it would 
be easy to incorporate Foucault into an account of a single, finished ‘logic’ 
extrapolated from a particular period in a USA and European ‘centre’. However, this 
would be to underestimate the mutability and adaptability of logics and how any 
logic is an unfinished, open, set of tendencies and potentialitiesi. A logic cannot, 
then, simply be realised or made manifest. Instead, particular neoliberalisms emerge 
as logics are actualised in diverse forms of ‘neoliberal reason’: by which I mean the 
problematisation and reordering of government and/or life through the market via 
styles of thinking-feeling and diverse techniques of intervention (principally 
although not exclusively through formal mechanisms of calculative choice).  
As he demarcates what makes neoliberalism new, Foucault gestures towards 
how particular affects are part of this novel problematisation of life/market. Partly, 
this is because the lectures hint that the extension of relations of competition 
reorders affective life and that competition itself may have something like a tone. 
The illustrations of American neoliberalism’s unlimited extension of a market-based 
‘grid of intelligibility’ through ‘human capital’ are, for example, often affective 
relations normatively involving love - marriage (Foucault 2008: 268) and mother-
child relations (ibid. 243-244). His distinction between German and American 
neoliberalisms turns on the former’s emphasis on the necessity of ‘warm’ 
compensatory mechanisms in comparison to the ‘coldness’ of competition. 
Unsurprisingly, though, the connection with affect that has been most explicitly 
taken up concerns Foucault’s emphasis on the centrality of homo oeconomicus as the 
“eminently governable” subject of interests who “responds systematically to 
modifications in the variables of the environment” (ibid. 270).   
There is, though, another usually neglected trace of affect in Foucault: that 
particular collective affects condition how neoliberalism emerges, circulates, and is 
transformed. His brief remarks on ‘state phobia’ – an ‘ambiguous’ anxiety or fear 
about the state (Foucault 2008) – point to how we might supplement a concern with 
discursive or ideological mediation. For state-phobia exists as something like a 
background condition for the formation and circulation of the extension of relations 
of competition. But it is irreducible to neoliberalism. Foucault emphasises its 
polymorphous origins (ibid.: 78), in doing so reminding us that there may not be an 
exclusive relation, or tight homology, between a collective affect and a particular 
form or style of political reason (likewise with the ‘diffuse social anxiety’ Wacquant 
identifies). As a distinctive pattern of pressures and limits, state-phobia is a mobile 
condition, crossing between forms of neoliberalism and the French and international 
left. Formulated and at one point localisable in the crisis of governmentality between 
1930 and 1945, state-phobia came to have a “force of circulation” (ibid. 189). 
Speaking in 1977, Foucault stresses its many sources and agents: “the Soviet 
experience of the 1920s, the German experience of Nazism, English post-war 
planning, and so on” (ibid. 76).  
We can think, then, of how resonances are created at the level of collective 
affects between disparate, even divergent, forms of political reason. As Hannah 
(2015: 2) argues, contemporary state-phobia is not only neoliberal. It also imbues: 
liberal-bourgeois concern with a ‘crisis of democracy’; concern from left and right 
with the surveillance state; and radical left-wing critique of the state as repressive. 
This introduces another way in which a logic/reason is and becomes different. 
Folded with and into neoliberal reason are collective affects, state-phobia being but 
one, that gather within them elements of other forms and styles of reasoning. 
Neoliberal relations with the state are multiple and ambivalent. Nevertheless, we 
might think of state-phobia as an affective condition in the sense that it is part of, 
and shapes, how (neo)liberalism counterpoises state to market. It is at once an 
affective expression of other conditions and an affective force itself that conditions, 
without determining, how the state is related to and felt. For Foucault, state-phobia 
is a ‘sign’ of a crisis of liberal governmentality that neoliberal reason responds to and 
that is also ‘manifested’ in a “number of re-evaluations, re-appraisals, and new 
projects in the art of government” (Foucault 2008: 69). State-phobia is also, at the 
same time, a mediating state effect/affect that conditions in two ways. First, the state 
is endowed with an “endogenous imperialism” (ibid. 187) in relation to civil society 
(positioned as “its other, its outside, its target, and its object” (ibid. 187)). Second, 
and linked to the emphasis on the evolutionary dynamism of the state, there is a 
“genetic continuity” (ibid. 187) between different forms of the state. With the result 
that what the actual state does is passed over in favour of a future-orientated 
“general disqualification by the worst” (ibid. 188) that enacts affectively “the great 
fantasy of the paranoiac and devouring state” (ibid. 189).  
State-poebia is not singular. We could track different but partially connected 
raced and classed state-phobias across actualisations of neoliberalism (Baldwin 
2015). For example, consider contemporary UK right-wing state-poebia orientated to 
the supposed excesses of the welfare state in the context of the cuts, retractions and 
reforms of austerity. As Tyler (2013) shows, critiques of the excesses of the welfare 
state and the dependencies it supposedly engenders is inseperable from the 
stigmatisation of ‘national abjects’ (47) in classed and raced terms (see Hancock 
(2004) on the role of the affective image of the poor, black, female ‘Welfare queen’ in 
intensifying the push to ‘roll back’ the welfare state in 1980s America). What is 
useful conceptually is the sense that neoliberal reason is actualised in the midst of 
collective affects that are irreducible to neoliberal reason. In two ways, this avoids 
collapsing affect into a secondary effect of discursive or ideological forms of 
mediation or the object-target of top-down processes of subjectification. First, it 
gestures towards the particular ways in which collective affects mediate, in that they 
shape how things are made present and come to have significance. Second, it helps 
us understand the affective present as a series of barely-coherent, amorphous, 
backgrounds that people adjust to, live with and dwell in. In the remainder of the 
paper I develop these starting points by offering two pragmatic-contextual 
translations of my initial definition of affect: ‘atmospheres’ and ‘structures of 
feeling’. Each translation is designed to draw attention to particular ways in which 
affects condition neoliberal reason and particular actualisations of neoliberalism.  
Let’s turn, first, to some of the occasions through which neoliberal reason 
emerged. My emphasis will be on the atmospheres that imbued those occasions. 
Where I use the term atmosphere to disclose indeterminate affective impressions 
that emanate from and envelope particular enclosed arrangements. The two 
empirical occasions I focus on – the meetings of the Mont Pelerin Society and the 
workshop in the ‘Chicago School’ of economics – serve as examples for two reasons. 
First, my focus on a workshop and a meeting is intended to show the ordinariness of 
neoliberalism’s affective life even in what have become paradigmatic organisations, 
that is the way in which neoliberalisms emerge and are (re)made through 
innumerable, partially connected occasions that are at once generic (a ‘meeting’ or 
‘workshop’) and singular. Second, I focus on the occasions because, as I will show, 
they were critical to the formation of what, after Plehwe (2009), we can call 
neoliberal thought-feeling collectives. Through the production of affinities at the 
level of feeling, both acted as occasions for the inculcation of shared styles of 
reasoning across transnational networks, organisations and people. Whilst my focus 
on the two examples is brief and intended in this paper to be illustrative, I 
retrospectively reconstruct something of now residual atmospheres by following 
their after-lives; including in biographies, reminiscences, and official accountsii.  
 
III: Neoliberal Atmospheres 
 
Founded by Friedrich Von Hayek and first meeting in the Hotel du Pac near 
Mont Pélerin in April 1947, the initial meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society was 
attended by thirty-nine economists, historians and philosophers. Over ten days, the 
participants came together for a series of discussions, excursions and informal meals 
in the hope of fostering a ‘new’ or ‘revised’ liberalism (Burgin 2012). The affective 
background being what the Society’s founding statement described as a “crisis of 
our times” in which “human dignity” and “freedom” were threatened by “the 
constant menace from the development of current tendencies in policy” iii 
(specifically the post-World-War ‘socialist’ revival of forms of ‘state intervention’). 
As Plehwe (2009: 16) emphasises, participants shared a sense of isolation and 
despair.  
Recalling the first meeting of the Society, Milton Friedman praises a “collegial 
atmosphere” where participants “could discuss freely their differences, and try out 
new ideas, without having to watch out for someone waiting for a chance to skewer 
them” (Friedman & Friedman 1998: 333). The “spirit” of the meetings supposedly 
afforded “spirited discussion of serious intellectual issues” (ibid.: 582). Accounts of 
the meeting highlight its ‘convivial’ atmosphere (Burgin 2012). In the midst of post–
War crisis and the fervent belief that a revival of liberalism was necessary and just 
about achievable, the atmosphere of the ‘closed’ meeting was one element in the 
formation of a transnational community of intellectual amity. Even if not named as 
such, perhaps its atmospheres live on in the warm tone with which the meeting (and 
the journey to the meeting) is later described by participants; in the photographs of 
the group that have become a public record of the meeting; in the position granted 
the meeting in the official record of the Society (Hartwell 1995), amongst other 
traces. Always multiple, atmospheres change. Later meetings will be described by 
MPS member John Davenport as “stormy” (quoted in Friedman & Friedman 1998: 
160). Reflecting on the expansion of the Society to over 250 people, and reminding us 
of changes in the generic form of the meetings, the National Review warned of a 
shift from an “intimate atmosphere of a select group” to “the business-like 
atmosphere of a professional convention” (Fertig 1962: 311 cited in Burgin 2012: 128).  
The Mont Pelerin Society is one of a number of origins for neoliberalism, as 
long as we use the term ‘origin’ advisedly to refer to what Bennett (2010: 33) terms a 
“complex, mobile, and heteronomous enjoiner of forces”iv. As is now well known, 
neoliberal reason is mutable, as it is formulated, circulated and reworked through 
partially connected transnational networks of exchanges. We might think of the 
meeting as one forum where the ‘inflationary anti-state suspicion’ that Foucault 
(2008) writes of intensifies and from which it circulates alongside a fierce belief in 
liberalism, even if neither originate there. The meetings are occasions for the 
reconstruction of liberalism, as part of what Peck (2010: 40) terms “an insistent 
search for intellectual amity at a distance”. And key to that reconstruction in the 
early meetings was a mode of speech and encounter - a “privitised, strategic, elite 
deliberation” (ibid: 49) as Peck describes it - that was consensual on the threat to 
liberalism but was not ‘harmonious’ (Stigler 1988) on how the state should intervene 
in society to create a market order (see Hartwell 1995). The style and tone of speech 
being one element, amongst others, in the (re)making of an intimate atmosphere that 
countered the ‘isolation’ and ‘despair’ members shared. Other elements being the 
geographic remoteness and separation of the mountain setting, the closed nature of 
the meeting, and the hope that the crisis of liberalism could be ended.  
My brief example of the Mont Pelerin Society was intended to introduce the 
first translation of affect: atmospheres that are part of the real conditions of 
emergence for neoliberal styles of reasoning and objects of neoliberal reason v .  
Atmospheres that are part of and are (re)constituted through the activities that make 
up occasions, may become something shared between participants, and may live on. 
Atmospheres may, in short, be part of the birth and momentum of neoliberalisms. 
Nevertheless, they are tensed between the perceptible and imperceptible, the quasi-
objective and the quasi-subjective. They are recalled and named, but they are at the 
same time indeterminate, hazy. Atmospheres are at once singular and vague. 
Consider, for example, how the atmospheres of the first meeting fold into the 
Society’s founding statement. Whilst there is no necessary relation between a 
statement and the atmospheres constituted by acts that include the writing of the 
statement, the text holds together around a sense of hope for what the Society might 
accomplish in the midst of crisis: “Its object is solely, by facilitating the exchange of 
views among minds inspired by certain ideals and broad conceptions held in 
common to contribute to the preservation and improvement of the free society”vi. 
Perhaps it is a sense of inauguration, of hope against the ‘despair’ participants 
shared (Hartwell 1995), that is relived when participants warmly recall the meeting 
or retrospectively grant the Society some degree of causal significance in what 
Friedman called “victory in the war of ideas” (Friedman & Friedman 1998: 582).  
Neoliberal reason is always, then, a thinking-feeling, not only a rationality. As 
well as having a tone, it emerges in the midst of the indeterminate atmospheres that 
imbue occasions. It is not only the atmospheres of occasions that are part of the real 
conditions of emergence for neoliberal reason. Networks, Societies and other 
organisations may embody atmospheres (in part through the repetition of meetings 
and other singular-generic occasions) and function atmospherically. In their critical 
account of the emergence of the ‘think tank’ as site/scene for thinking, Baxstrom 
(2005, no pagination) et al argue that think-tanks have a “habitual mode of ‘thinking-
feeling’”. Their examples are security related think-tanks, principally RAND, which 
produce concepts “linked to the affective mode of ever-present threat perception, 
panic and anxiety”. That is, any think-tank has an “affective tendency” that imbues 
its practices and products of thinking. For example, the USA think-tanks that 
propagate belief in a variant of neoliberal reason – The Heritage Foundation or The 
American Enterprise Foundation, say - combine a sense of the threat the state poses 
to various precarious ‘freedoms’ with reassertions of a bellicose faith in growth as 
the predominant social policy (Connolly 2008). We might speculate on how these 
and other organisations that develop neoliberal solutions prime the tones that 
become attached to and are carried by policies. Whilst not the focus of this paper, I 
use the word ‘tone’ to refer to how any ‘neoliberal object’ (a policy etc) possess an 
“affective bearing”: a ”general disposition or orientation toward its audience and the 
world” (Ngai 2005: 28). Tone is sensed when a cluster of more or less vague affective 
impressions accompany a policy. For example, Wacquant (2010) stresses how 
punitive penal policy is legitimised by reference to the affective image of the 
underclass as cause of a widespread sense of insecurity. Perhaps the most pervasive, 
but little remarked upon, example of tone is how efforts to extend relations of 
competition are accompanied by and enabled by hopes in the market as the source of 
individual and public good. Consider, for example, the cluster of promises through 
which contemporary austerity measures are justified (Raynor 2015). Retraction of the 
material resources of the state and of the social-democratic promise of the state, has 
been, in part, justified through hope in the market as the best mechanism for the 
provision of previously public things.  
Atmospheres are complex conditions that simultaneously imbue and undo 
distinctions between occasions, organisations, styles of thinking, and objects. 
Perhaps the atmospheres of occasions/organisations have an emergent causality that 
can be retrospectively traced in the tone of policies, ideas and so on. However, 
atmospheres are not simply reproduced or expressed without differences. And they 
do not simply pre-exist the formation of organisations or neoliberal objects/reason. 
Undoing distinctions between cause and effect, atmospheres emanate from and fold 
back into dynamic constellations of people, things and ideas. Consider the 
importance of the intensely combative workshop system in the constitution of the 
affective tendencies of the ‘second’ ‘Chicago School’. The workshop, initiated by 
Milton Friedman, became a key site for (re)producing an increasingly “assertive” 
(Peck 2010: 96) hyperrationalist economic orthodoxy, or what, after Connolly (2008), 
we could call an ‘existential bellicosity’. The economist Garry Becker reminisces 
about the atmosphere that he found on arrival in Chicago:  
 
“When I came to Chicago as a graduate student in 1951 I was flabbergasted by 
how stimulating the atmosphere was. I’d been a very good student at 
Princeton, the first day in Friedman’s class he raised a question. I answered. He 
replied ‘that’s no answer, that’s just rephrasing the question’. That was the 
example of how blunt people were”.  
(Garry Becker, ‘Chicago School of Economics: Forces of the Market’) 
 
Becker describes being affected (‘Flabbergasted’) by a stimulating atmosphere. An 
atmosphere that is made, in part, by the blunt tone of a speech-act, but is also 
informed by the affective contrast with other partially connected sites (‘Princeton’).  
Here we get a sense of the complex relays and indistinctions between the 
atmospheres of a generic occasion (a ‘workshop’), of the ‘Chicago School’, and of 
styles of thinking. There is more to be said about each. We could stress, for example, 
the masculinism and geographic and political marginality of the ‘Chicago School’ 
that led Friedman to fondly reminisce about his time in an “exciting place” that 
preserved an “atmosphere of the search for truth” (Friedman & Friedman 1998: 35).  
Atmospheres are, then, part of the occasions/organisations through which 
neoliberal reason forms and what moves as neoliberalisms circulate. We might say 
that this makes neoliberalism into an atmospheric kind of thing. Atmospheres 
extend beyond enclosed sites (the meeting or workshop) to constitute a ‘Society’ or a 
‘School’ as a transnational, mutable space of affective belonging and attachment. For 
example, perhaps the ’Mont Pelerin Society’ and ‘Chicago School connect at the level 
of affective tendencies, or what Connolly (2008) terms ‘affinities of sensibility’ which 
cross ideational differences and overlaps of personnel (Van Horn & Mirowski 2009). 
Atmospheres also live on, in changed form, through dispositions, habits, memories 
and styles. Without using those terms, Peck (2010: 102) gestures towards the fluid 
topology of atmospheres when describing ‘Chicago types’:  
 
“While Chicago types remained a small minority, they were emboldened both 
by the strength of their convictions and by a sustaining belief that the 
collectivist-interventionist tide would eventually turn, the fervency of which 
has been likened to religious forms of devotion”. 
(Peck 2010: 102) 
 
 What animates ‘Chicago types’ is, in part, a ‘belief’ and ‘fervency’ in the market. 
‘Belief in the market’, the ‘threat of collectivism’ or other atmospheres may be 
amplified as they are carried by networks of neoliberal reason. Those who encounter 
those networks may be assailed by neoliberal atmospheres, may happen across 
them, may be gently nudged by them, or may otherwise be affected.   
The spatiality of neoliberal atmospheres is doubled, then. Atmospheres come 
and go in particular enclosures that they emanate from and temporarily envelope. 
But atmospheres or traces of atmospheres also move and change form, becoming 
‘capacities to affect and be affected’ such as a ‘sustaining belief’ or the feeling of 
being ‘emboldened’. For example, Mirowski (2013) stresses the “belligerence” of the 
‘neoliberal thought collective’ as hopes in market solutions persisted after the 2008 
financial crisis. It was not only that solutions were ‘ready to hand’ through a well-
established network that simultaneously “sowed doubt” and “promoted ignorance”, 
producing, Mirowski claims, an affective public sphere of confusion (ibid. 83, 92). In 
addition, neoliberal ideas and policies retained a momentum and force. Mirowski 
touches on various occasions (including the 2009 meeting of the Mont Pelerin 
Society) in which hopes in market solutions to the crisis were reasserted. Of course, 
for many hope in neoliberal solutions may be weak or fragile, may have fallen apart 
or been disappointed, or may have been barely or never present.  
Atmospheres are critical to the ongoing constitution of neoliberalism in two 
ways that blur any divide between affective and non-affective conditions. First, as 
part of what occasions and organisations/networks actually are, atmospheres 
participate in the conditions of emergence for neoliberal reason/logic. Second, 
neoliberal organisations, policies and so on become present atmospherically and 
those atmospheres accompany the circulation of neoliberal objects. The atmospheres 
that envelop and animate occasions, organisations, policies, and so on are complexly 
related to a second translation of my initial definition of affect: ‘structures of feeling’ 
that condition how particular neoliberalisms become part of everyday life. 
  
IV: ‘Structures of Feeling’ and the Affective Present 
  
The concept of ‘structure of feeling’ allows some purchase on the vague, 
amorphous affective conditions that are nevertheless critical to the differential 
translation and expression of neoliberal reason in particular contexts. As such, it 
supplements recent work on ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism that has centred the 
question of how particular neoliberalisms are (re)made and analysed the multiplicity 
of forces that are part of how neoliberalisms form. First described by Williams (1961: 
63) as the “felt sense of the quality of life” in a defined period, ‘structures of feeling’ 
“exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and on action” 
(Williams 1977: 132) as they condition experience. Structures of feeling and 
atmospheres orientate inquiry to different forms of affective life. Atmospheres are 
ephemeral affective impressions that envelope particular enclosed forms (in the 
above examples an occasion, a network and then particular bodies). Structures of 
feeling return us to the idea of dispersed moods discussed above. A structure of 
feeling is best thought of as a set of distributed “forming and formative processes” 
(ibid. 128) constitutive of a “specific present” (ibid. 129). What is forming is a 
“particular quality” of experience that gives a “sense” of what Williams (ibid. 131) 
describes as a “generation or a period”. The “particular quality” and “sense” 
constitute an experience of the present that both extends beyond particular 
sites/occasions and is shared across otherwise separate sites/occasions. Let’s 
illustrate this formal distinction by returning to the Mont Pelerin Society. The 
‘collegiate atmosphere’ that enveloped the initial meeting is not equivalent to, but 
happens in the midst of, a more durable, distributed ‘sense’ of post-War ‘crisis’.  
My examples here are some of the moods that pressed and limited 1970s 
British ‘Thatcherism’. Understood as distributed affective qualities that bestow an 
“enigmatic coherence” (Pfau 2005) across differences, the structures of feeling I 
describe by way of Stuart Hall do not add up to a totality that could exhaust what 
can be said of 1970s Britain or any other affective present. Their coherence is, at best, 
a disjunctive synthesis that folds with and into the particular iteration of 
neoliberalism that Hall (1988) gave the name ‘Thatcherism’ to. What this means, 
though, is that particular neoliberalisms will be actualised in relation to and through 
structures of feeling that are always-already more than neoliberal. The ‘structures of 
feeling’ that are part of neoliberalisms other than Thatcherism – say the mix with 
evangelical Christianity in the USA (Connolly 2008) or ‘neoliberalism with Chinese 
characteristics’ (Harvey 2005) - will likely vary. Or, put differently, there is not and 
cannot be a single typically ‘neoliberal’ structure of feeling. Instead, the task for 
analysis is to sense and grasp the effects of the always particular tangle of structures 
of feeling at play as part of specific circumstances or contexts. Because structures of 
feeling are particularising, I stay longer with the example of Thatcherism in order to 
hold onto how structures of feeling are “in solution” (Williams 1977: 133) and 
“formalised, classified, and … built into institutions and formations” (ibid. 133)vii.   
In an essay first published in 1978 that launched the word ‘Thatcherism’ into 
political vocabulary, Hall (1988: 40) tracks a shift in “popular mood”: a “swing to the 
right” that expressed a retraction of the post-war social-democratic promise in the 
midst of a translation of neoliberal logic/reason into a political project. Together 
with colleagues, he (Hall et al 1988) describes in affective terms the cluster of crises 
in which a variant of neoliberalism took hold. They touch on the “virulence” of the 
reappearance of the “red scare” in relation to the miners and other ‘enemies within’ 
(ibid. 20). They describe the middle classes as “in a state of irritable, Thatcher-like 
arousal” (ibid. 22). At the same time, ‘the crisis’ comes to be organised around a 
“collective conspiratorial paranoia” (ibid. 26) that “the British way of life” was 
threatened from within. In this climate of something like emergency, an “exceptional 
state” flourishes, buoyed by an “authoritarian mood” (ibid. 27).  
Whilst this was not their intention, Hall et al remind us that the ‘affective 
present’ consists of multiple, co-existing, structures of feeling that enter into loose 
relation, rather than tight homology, with actualisations of neoliberal logic. Consider 
how Berlant (2011) senses a quieter scene of ‘crisis ordinariness’ in contemporary 
USA. In the midst of the slow fraying and fading of the USA post-war good life 
fantasy, ordinary living in the present involves a continual drama of adjustment to a 
world that no longer provides the ground for fantasies that people nevertheless cling 
onto. Optimism, even if often cruel, makes life liveable amid scenes of neoliberal 
restructuring that Berlant (2011: 11) claims “create manifest crisis situations in 
ordinary existence for more kinds of people”. Compare with Fisher (2009) on 
‘capitalist realism’: a sense of capitalism’s inevitability amid the loss of other sources 
of hope that accompanies some actualisations of neoliberalism. A “pragmatic 
adjustment” to neoliberalism (Fisher & Gilbert 2013: 90), capitalist realism involves 
resignation, fatalism, acquiescence and apathy.   
These examples remind us that structures of feeling are the resonances that 
create a dispersed but shared ‘affective present’ felt across diverse phenomena (an 
‘affective present’ that is multiple and will be differentially related to and lived). So 
Fisher (2009), for example, diagnoses how a ‘sense of inevitability’ infuses multiple 
spaces of neoliberal restructuring and, at the same time, connects those spaces. As 
well being resonances, structures of feeling intensify around scenes/objects/figures 
through which people are pulled into the orbit of neoliberal reason. For example, the 
figure of the ‘welfare queen’ that I discussed earlier folds welfare policy into racist 
structures of feeling that associate threat with blackness, single mothers and the 
‘ghetto’. Another example would be the presence of the ‘sense of inevitability’ that 
Fisher diagnoses. The ‘sense’ is present through the absence of the imagination of 
alternatives and is (re)enacted in resigned or fatalistic claims that, whether desirable 
or not, capitalism is the only realistic system for the organisation of today’s economy. 
It intensifies when alternatives are ignored, denounced, mocked, demonised and 
otherwise discredited through the charge of being ‘unrealistic’ or ‘utopian’. 
Consider, for example, the figure of the ‘extreme-left’ in post Thatcher UK politics 
who are discredited through the charge that they have failed to adjust to reality. In 
this process, structures of feeling may be present atmospherically – through affective 
impressions that envelope political movements and figures.  
Much more is implicated in this process of dispersion/intensification than the 
formation of ‘neoliberal subjects’. So, as well as the cluster of structures of feeling 
Hall notes above, the particular translation that is ‘Thatcherism’ was inseperable 
from the intensifications of a kind of ‘anxiety’ that temporarily attached to various 
‘othered’ objects/figures/scenes before moving to new ones. Take race:  
 
“The fears about race are not explicated by a succession of panics about blacks, 
or catharsized by Powellite rhetoric, or calmed by tougher and tougher 
measures of control on the entry of immigrants. Up they rise again, now about 
‘the ghetto’, or about black schools, or about the black unemployed, or about 
black crime”.  
(Hall et al 1988: 36)  
 
Emergent from the overlap and convergence of specific ‘moral panics’, was the sense 
of a “multi-faceted and one” (Hall et al 1988: 36) ‘enemy’ present everywhere that is 
the counterpoint to a white, classed, ‘British people’ that Thatcherism attempted to 
redistribute hopes of social mobility to. This doubled structure of feeling – 
attachment of anxieties and resonance of multiple anxieties into ‘one’ threat to the 
‘British people’ – provided one affective condition for the authoritarian pole that, 
alongside a particular form of populism, characterised Thatcherism.  
Hall et al provide us with a sense of interlocking crises lived through 
multiple, overlapping, structures of feeling that condition, without determining, the 
translation and actualisation of neoliberalism in the formation ‘Thatcherism’. There 
is a twofold spatiality at play. On the one hand, structures of feeling are (re)enacted 
through and intensify in particular scenes/objects/figures (‘Schools’, ‘The Ghetto’ 
and so on). On the other hand, they happen as diffuse affective qualities that create 
resonances across otherwise separate spaces (the presence of the ‘enemy’). Through 
intensifications and resonances, they condition without determining how things can 
be attuned to and come to be present and felt. Consider Thatcherism’s doubled 
relation with the state – one that was slightly different to the strategic use of and 
disavowal of the state typically associated with neoliberalism. If one state 
affect/effect is the ‘law-and-order’ state, the other involved an intense critique of the 
state. In his essay on the shift to the right, Hall (1988) diagnosed an ‘anti-state’ mood 
that was one way in which a disintegration of the post-war social-democratic 
consensus was felt. Its basis was in a critique of the social democratic corporatist 
state that involved a particular iteration of ‘state-phobia’ refracted through the then 
conjuncture of crisis and intensified by experiences of numbing bureaucracy. A state 
that Hall (1988: 50) claims was massively present in everyday life and used to 
“discipline, limit, and police the very classes it claimed to represent”. He roots the 
gradual attachment to ‘anti-statism’ around a claim of how such a state had became 
felt in ordinary spaces of everyday life, what we could term the “state affects” 
(Woodward 2014) of the corporatist state in and as part of crisis:  
 
“Whether in the growing dole queues or in the waiting-rooms of an over-
burdened National Health Service, or suffering the indignities of Social 
Security, the corporatist state is increasingly experienced by them [‘working 
people’] not as a benefice but as a powerful bureaucratic imposition on ‘the 
people’”. 
(Hall 1988: 51) 
 
Hall claims the state of social-democratic corporatism was no longer felt as ‘neutral-
benevolent’, even if it was only ever felt as such for some. It was instead felt as 
imposition, present through the alienating affects of bureaucracy. As with Foucault’s 
(2008) comments on how state-phobia involves a “disqualification by the worst”, the 
Thatcherite critique works by rendering the ‘state bureaucracy and collectivism’ of 
the social-democratic corporatist state equivalent to ‘socialism’ and the “spectre” 
(Hall 1988: 51) of actually existing Eastern European socialism. Instead of working 
around the anticipatory hyper-vigilance that Foucault (2008) argues marks diagnoses 
of ‘state-phobia’, signs and symptoms of crisis are retrospectively attached to ‘the 
state’. ‘The state’ becomes the cause of a sense of turbulence. Hall claims that it is felt 
and disclosed as the enemy of a raced and classed ‘British People’. The actualisation 
of neoliberalism that Hall names ‘Thatcherism’ is conditioned, then, by structures of 
feeling that mark a point of transition from the social-democratic state, as well as 
resonating with other emergent structures of feeling in a ‘shift’ rightward. Hage 
(2003), for example, argues that Thatcherism attached the weak hope of 
individualised/familial social mobility to housing market participation in the 
context of the aforementioned loss of hope in social-democratic collective structures.  
Hall’s is only one account of a now residual affective present. In itself, it is not 
sufficient as a diagnosis of the affective geographies of Thatcherism (nor of how 
Thatcherism lives on affectively in contemporary austerity politics). Nevertheless, it 
is exemplary of a way of discerning the jumble of structures of feeling that condition 
how neoliberalism actualises in nameable (‘Thatcherism’) political formations. 
Structures of feeling are part of the ‘tangle’ (Collier 2012: 189) of things – (trans)local 
political conditions, transformations of the global economy, and so on – that 
neoliberal logic/reason happens in the midst of and becomes differently with. In 
how they exist as resonances between contexts, perhaps structures of feeling are part 
of the ‘contexts of contexts’ for neoliberalisms, albeit in a quite different way to how 
the singular phrase ‘context of context’ is normally used (see Brenner et al 2010). At 
the same time as they condition, neoliberalisms might exist as structures of feeling: 
dispersed qualities such as a ‘sense of inevitability’ or an ‘anxiety about the state’ 
that become part of policies, programmes and projects that extend the market. If so, 
this gives us cause to reconsider what is meant by the phrase ‘actually existing’ in 
calls to attend to ‘actually existing’ neoliberal regimes or neoliberal states. 
Neoliberalism might ‘actually exist’ as a dispersed particular quality or sense. As 
much as it was a set of reforms and a political project, Thatcherism ‘actually existed’ 
in how the authoritarian state and the market were felt, for some, as sources of hope. 
And yet, structures of feeling are irreducible to neoliberalism. They always fold in 
and express at least a trace of other spaces and times. ‘Neoliberal’ structures of 
feeling are composed through multiple elements; including affective qualities that 
were/are part of formations that cannot be solely identified with neoliberalism (in 
Thatcherism’s case those associated with nationalist belonging, amongst others).  
 
V: Concluding Comments: Neoliberal Affects? 
 
What I’ve offered in this paper is a vocabulary for understanding how 
different kinds of collective affects are part of the real conditions for the formation of 
neoliberal logic/reason and for the actualisation of particular neoliberalisms. I have 
also tried to understand ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism as, in part, composed of 
ephemeral atmospheres and dispersed structures of feeling. Perhaps vague, possibly 
amorphous, such affects do not add up to a single dominant mood. My aim has been 
to avoid reproducing a totalising account of the affective present by holding onto the 
multiplicity and ambivalences of affective life. There are, of course, a series of other 
geographies that would further complexify my account of neoliberal life; not least 
the political affects of indignation, rage or hope that animate and fold into 
oppositional movements in neoliberalism’s “socio-spatial frontiers” (Peck 2010: 6). 
Nor in this paper have I honed in on affective damages and how they may shift what 
a body can do i.e. a body’s capacities to affect and be affected. For an example of 
work that stays with how neoliberalism harms, consider Povinelli’s (2011) 
description of the ‘social projects’ through which people make affective ‘conditions 
of endurance’ amid disrupted, fractured lives.  
My analysis has aimed to supplement, rather than replace, existing cultural 
approaches to understanding the constitution of neoliberalism, whilst recognising 
that most approaches to neoliberalism make implicit claims about affective life. 
Existing cultural approaches collapse a concern with affect into the question of the 
formation of ‘neoliberal subjects’ through signifying processes and/or governmental 
techniques/technologies. Questions of affect are not simply ignored – ideology 
critique presumes that dominant ideas are lived affectively, for example, whilst 
governmentality approaches assume that subjectification involves the moulding of 
affective dispositions – but they reduce questions of the organisation of affect to one 
form/process of mediation. In this context, I have tried to do two things that both 
expand from the claim that neoliberalisms are mediated affectively. First, I have 
argued that particular atmospheres are part of the real conditions of formation for 
neoliberal reason/objects and, as such, are central to understanding the momentum 
of policies, programmes and so on. Second, I have emphasised that neoliberalisms 
happen as/in the midst of dynamic structures of feeling that are more than 
neoliberal, and become part of the processes whereby the unfinished logic of 
neoliberalism is differentially actualised. This means that claims about ‘neoliberal 
affects’ are always claims about a particular geo-historical conjuncture, the 
constitution and limits of which are empirical questions. Consequently, discerning a 
‘collegial atmosphere’ or an ‘authoritarian mood’, as I have done in this paper, may 
tell us nothing about the ‘neoliberal affects’ of other conjunctures. 
This leads to some questions for future research that attempts to understand 
how and with what consequences neoliberalism as a singular but always unfinished 
logic is differentially actualised in geo-historically specific circumstances. The first 
set of questions concern the manner in which neoliberal reason emerges and 
circulates; how do atmospheres envelop the sites and networks through which 
neoliberal reason is formed and moves?; how do atmospheres attach to particular 
policies and programmes, that is, how are atmospheres assembled and achieved? 
And how does the tone of reason have effects, or what do the cluster of promises 
and threats, hopes and fears, that surround and infuse particular solutions do? The 
next set of questions concern how neoliberal logic/reason is actualised through 
structures of feeling; how do structures of feeling press and limit scenes of neoliberal 
restructuring?; how and who do structures of feeling harm or damage? And how are 
structures of feeling differentially lived, that is are adjusted to, acquiesced to, or 
disrupted? Finally, and extending beyond my emphasis on neoliberal reason in this 
paper, we might ask how neoliberalism is lived with/in if people’s attachments and 
investments in neoliberal objects lack the surety of enthusiastic endorsement or 
angry rejection? What atmospheres affect as violence? How is the atmosphere of a 
policy encountered as promises are reattached to solutions that have brought loss? 
How did Friedman’s ‘climate of opinion’ or Hall’s ‘more hospitable climate’ weigh 
too heavily on some peoples and how might some ‘climates’ fade or end? These 
questions anticipate future research that both understands specific affects as 
conditions for neoliberalisms and treats ‘actually existing’ neoliberalisms as affective.  
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i As used here, ‘logic’ is close to Deleuze’s (1988: 36) version of the term ‘diagram’: “a 
non-unifying immanent cause that is co-extensive with the whole social field”. There 
are parallels here with uses of the precursors ‘mode’ (Peck 2010: xiii on ‘mode of 
governance’) and ‘logic’ (Ong 2007 on ‘logic of governing’) in work that presumes 
neoliberalism as a mutable and adaptive process/form 
 
ii  The brief examples in this paper are from a wider project that encounters 
statements, (auto)biographies, official histories and secondary literature on 
neoliberalism for traces of affect. This involves a speculative attempt to reconstruct 
collective affects that are both of the past and residual elements in the present by; 
reading for explicit expression (when an atmosphere or mood is named and 
described), reading awry for the presence of affect in tone, and reading against the 
grain to draw out traces of affect (as in my engagement with Stuart Hall).   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
iii Extract from Founding Statement of Aims: Mont Pelerin Society, Switzerland, 
April 8th, 1947.  
 
iv  There are multiple other pre and post Second World War ‘birthplaces’ for 
neoliberal reason, including Vienna and London and the 1920s/30s writings of Mises 
and Hayak (Gane 2014) and post-War German ordoliberalism (Foucault 2008).  
 
v I use the neutral and generic designator ‘object of neoliberal reason’ to name the 
effects of neoliberal reasoning, including policies, proto-policies, regulatory 
experiments, texts and ideas. 
 
vi  Extract from Founding Statement of Aims: Mont Pelerin Society, Switzerland, 
April 8th, 1947.  
 
vii This section reads Hall’s work against the grain for affect. As is typical of work 
influenced by ideology critique, something like affect is present but in the 
background throughout Hall’s work. Given his attempt to understand the 
ambiguities of the popular, affect is not simply an occasion for the bodily inculcation 
of dominant ideas (and thus the affective accompaniment of ‘false consciousness’). 
Nevertheless, affect is typically collapsed into a concern with signifying forms of 
mediation “in and through the categories, classifications and frameworks of the 
culture” (Hall 1980: 6). For example, when reflecting on the two versions of culture 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
operative in cultural studies (‘culturalist’ and ‘structuralist’) he is critical of what he 
argues is Williams’ culturalist equation between culture and “indissoluble real 
material practice-in-general” (Hall 1980: 63). Despite this, I learn from Hall’s 
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